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GREGG v. GREGG
whether or not the Courts will sustain a Zoning Authority's
opinion without supporting evidence.
Under ordinary circumstances, the Courts are inclined
to give great weight to the findings of an administrative
body and are reluctant to reverse them unless they are
clearly arbitrary. However, in view of the cases already
handed down by the Court of Appeals of Maryland stressing
the strong presumption that once land is zoned it can only
be rezoned to correct an original error or because of the
change in surroundings, I think it safe to predict that the
Court of Appeals will follow the leaning of Judge Murray's
decisions and require that the legislative board, in order
to justify a rezoning classification, must have concrete facts
and evidence presented before it which will sustain its
decision on appeal to the Courts, and that without such
evidence the Courts will be justified in overruling the
reclassification as being legally arbitrary. As a result, the
mere recitation alone by an administrative board that the
reclassification would not jeopardize the public health,
safety, welfare, and morals will not be sufficient evidence to
sustain the reclassification in the event of appeal to the
Courts, and it becomes extremely important for any attor-
ney seeking a rezoning classification to have all his evidence
prepared and presented to the administrative body.
MAY A MARRIED WOMAN SUE HER
HUSBAND BY SUBROGATION?
Gregg v. Gregg'
Appellant wife filed a bill in equity in Circuit Court
No. 2 of Baltimore City for permanent alimony, counsel
fees and reimbursement for sums expended by her for
necessaries. A demurrer to the bill was properly sustained,2
and on an amended bill, omitting the prayer for reimburse-
ment for necessaries, she was awarded permanent alimony
and counsel fees. Thereafter appellant brought this action
at law against her husband in the Baltimore City Court
seeking $2,500 which she claimed to have expended for
necessaries since her desertion by her husband, but before
her alimony suit was filed. Appellant wife claimed this sum
,Heaps v. Cobb, 185 Md. 373, 45 A. 2d 73 (1945) ; Johnstown Coal and
Coke Co. v. Dishong, 84 A. 2d 847 (Md., 1951).
187 A. 2d 581 (1952).
Infra, n. 13.
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had not been repaid to her although it was the husband's
duty to provide for her support. Appellee husband's de-
murrer to this suit was sustained without leave to amend,
from which ruling this appeal was taken.
The question thus presented to the Court for the first
time was whether a wife, who is still a wife, may sue her
husband on the theory of subrogation to recover a sum
expended for necessaries purchased and paid for by her
before alimony was awarded.
After a review of the Married Women's Emancipatory
Acts8 the Court of Appeals held: "That statute, however, is
strictly limited to contracts made with a husband, and we
cannot extend it to contracts which the husband has with
someone else, and which the wife acquires by subrogation."4
Thus the Court affirmed the rule that the rigorous common
law disabilities of a femme covert still prevail to the extent
of this claim. The result quite clearly is that the wife may
not invoke law or equity to recover a sum expended for
necessaries which the husband was under a duty in the first
instance to provide but failed to do.
The common law placed the married woman in a peculiar
legal position.
"Under the common law husband and wife become
by marriage one person, and the entire legal existence
of the woman is completely merged or incorporated in
that of the husband. This fundamental principle is the
foundation of the common-law theory and rules of
rights, duties, and disabilities of marriage. '
Thus the wife alone could not sue or be sued in contract or
tort. It is this disability at which the Married Women's
Emancipatory Acts have been aimed. A concomitant fea-
ture of this disability was the duty imposed on the husband
by common law to supply the wife with necessaries. An
"agency of necessity" was the legal medium by which the
common law sought to provision the disabled wife against
the recalcitrant husband.' The wife could contract for
necessaries on her husband's credit and the law supplied
the remedy by which the supplier could recover from the
husband regardless of his acquiescence. Obviously a variant
of this question was the one involved in the instant case,
8 Md. Code (1951), Art. 45, Sees. 5, 20.
'Supra, n. 1, 584.
S26 Am. Jur., Husband & Wife, Sec. 3, p. 632.
Jones v. Gutman, 88 Md. 355, 41 A. 898 (1898) ; McFerren v. Goldsmith-
Stern Co., 137 Md. 573, 113 A. 348 (1921).
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although the substantive features of a valid agency of
necessity never came to the fore, inasmuch as the Court
found that the wife's disability precluded recovery on that
ground alone.
The Maryland Married Women's Acts, passed in 1898
and 1900, respectively, provide, inter alia:
"Married women shall have power to engage in any
business, and to contract, whether engaged in business
or not, and to sue upon their contracts, and also to sue
for the recovery, security or protection of their prop-
erty, and for torts committed against them, as fully as
if they were unmarried; contracts may also be made
with them, and they may also be sued separately upon
their contracts, whether made before or during mar-
riage, and for wrongs independent of contract com-
mitted by them before or during their marriage, as
fully as if they were unmarried; and upon judgments
recovered against them, execution may be issued as if
they were unmarried; nor shall any husband be liable
upon any contract made by his wife in her own name
and upon her own responsibility, nor for any tort com-
mitted separately by her out of his presence, without
his participation or sanction." (The Act of 1898) 7
"A married woman may contract with her husband
and may form a copartnership with her husband or
with any other person or persons in the same manner
as if she were a femme sole, and upon all such con-
tracts, partnership or otherwise, a married woman may
sue and be sued as fully as if she were a femme sole."
(The Act of 1900)8
That the Act of 1898 did not abrogate the common law dis-
abilities of. the wife in relation to her husband was first
established in Furstenburg v. Furstenburg. That suit in-
volved a tort claim by a wife against her husband for in-
juries to the wife arising out of the husband's negligence.
In denying relief the Court noted that the Act of 1900
clearly indicated that the Act of 1898 was not intended by
the Legislature to abrogate the disabilities between a hus-
band and wife but only those between a wife and third
parties. Otherwise, the Act of 1900 would have been super-
fluous. In arriving at this decision the Court of Appeals
was admittedly influenced by the Supreme Court's decision
'Md. Code (1951), Art. 45, Sec. 5; Laws 1898, Ch. 457.
Md. Code (1951), Art. 45, Sec. 20; Laws 1900, Ch. 633.
152 Md. 247, 136 A. 534 (1927).
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in Thompson v. Thompson (Holmes, Hughes and Harlan
dissenting)10 in which case relief was denied under similar
facts under a District of Columbia statute. The Court of
Appeals had occasion to reaffirm this stand in a later case
where relief was denied a wife in a tort claim against a
partnership of which her husband was a member." Thus,
without doubt, the present state of the law in Maryland is
that a wife may not sue her husband for a tort against
her person.
Equally clear by the Act of 1900 is the fact that a wife
may sue on contracts made with her husband. The preposi-
tion "with" that appears in the act was given great stress
by the court in the Gregg case. Mrs. Gregg's contract was
not with her husband, but was rather with her supplier, and
was only acquired by the wife through subrogation. Had
the plaintiff purchased but not paid for the necessaries, her
supplier could have recovered in an action at law against
her husband if a true agency of necessity was made out.'2
Thus Mrs. Gregg ran afoul of the archaic rule of the common
law by paying cash on delivery. For her mistake neither
law or equity offers any apparent redress. In Mrs. Gregg's
prior equity action for separate alimony she had included
a prayer for recovery of the sum expended for necessaries
which were the same as those on which the instant case
was founded. Defendant's demurrer to the bill, because
of the prayer for reimbursement for necessaries, was sus-
tained in the equity action on the basis of Kriedo v. Kriedo.'3
In that case the wife, after being divorced a vinculo and
receiving custody of the child and a stipulated sum for
support, sought by a bill in equity to recover sums both
expended and accrued for extraordinary needs of the child
while ill. The Court dismissed the action stating that the
mother plaintiff was entitled to reimbursement for the
amounts she has actually paid ". . . but that upon the refusal
of the father to pay, the remedy is by a suit at law wherein
he is entitled to have a jury pass upon questions of fact,
including the inquiry as to whether the services were ren-
dered, whether they were necessary, and whether the
charge was a reasonable and proper one."' 4 In some juris-
dictions it appears that a money judgment can be entered
for necessaries in an equity suit.'5
- 218 U. S. 611 (1910).
nDavid v. David, 161 Md. 532, 157 A. 755, 81 A. L. R. 1100 (1932).
"Supra, n. 6.
' 159 Md. 229,150 A. 720 (1930).
"Ibid, 233. Italics added.
Eller v. Eller, 266 App. Div. 684, 40 N. Y. S. 2d 417 (1943).
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It seems clear from the language in the Gregg case"
that the court feels fettered by its earlier construction of
the Married Women's Acts. In the David17 case the Court,
after acknowledging the grounds for the common law disa-
bility of a wife, notes "... that the identity of husband and
wife persists in its original vigor until it has been com-
pletely dissolved by express legislative mandate, in re-
spect to all matters which the Legislature has not expressly
included within the meaning of the emancipatory statutes,
." In the Gregg case the Court states that:
"... these ancient theories which form a part of the
common law have to be followed by us unless they
have been changed by legislative action, and the clear
import of the decision in the David case is that the
emancipatory statutes must be strictly construed. The
Legislature has not amended or changed this emanci-
patory legislation since 1931, when the David case was
decided."'18
The Court in denying relief implies some reluctance. Strict
construction of these statutes, however, has generally been
the rule.19
A few jurisdictions have seen fit to adopt a more liberal
construction.2" Notable among these was the New York
case of DeBrauwere v. DeBrauwere" relied on by appellant
in the instant case. New York, in allowing the wife to
recover in a similar action money expended for necessaries,
did so on the ground that the New York statute completely
removed the wife's disabilities. An examination of the New
York statute22 reveals a slightly different choice of verbiage
but, it is submitted, nothing fundamentally different from
the Maryland statutes as to reason.
It is not entirely clear at common law whether the wife's
disability was regarded as a substantive disability or merely
a procedural one. It is clear, however, that the disability
had dual ramifications. So far as the wife and third parties
were concerned the wife and husband were merged into a
Supra, n. 1.
1 7 Supra, n. 11, 535.
Is Supra, n. 1, 583.
1Supra, n. 9, 10; MADDEN oN DOMESTIO RELATioNS (1931), Sees. 42-43,
p. 114.
. DeBrauwere v. DeBrauwere, 203 N. Y. 460, 96 N. E. 722 (1911);
Sodowsky v. Sodowsky, 51 Okla. 689, 152 P. 390 (1915) ; Bohun v. Kinasz,
124 Conn. 543, 200 A. 1015 (1938).
Ibid .N. Y. Domestic Relations Law, See. 51 (C. L. S., 1950).
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single legal personality by the common law. 23 Legal title
to the wife's property vested in the husband upon marriage.
In regard to the husband and wife inter sese there was the
additional consideration of preserving the tranquility and
sanctity of marriage. The Supreme Court has said that to
allow one of the parties to a marriage to sue the other in
tort would ".... open the doors of the courts to accusations
of all sorts of one spouse against the other, and bring into
public notice complaints for assault, slander and libel, and
alleged injuries to property of the one or the other, by
husband against wife or wife against husband."2 The same
considerations have prevailed in contract actions. The
Maryland statutes, Article 45, Sections 5 and 20 indicate a
recognition by the Legislature of a difference between
claims between a wife and a third party and claims between
husband and wife. Section 5 has been construed to relate
solely to claims between a wife and third parties. Section 20
has modified the relations between husband and wife to the
extent of allowing a wife to sue on contracts made with
a husband. So far as the former proposition is concerned
there is a diversity of authority as to whether at common
law a wife's contracts with third persons were void or
merely voidable.2 6 So far as the latter proposition is con-
cerned, the husband-wife setup, little authority has been
found in Maryland. It has been recognized in this state
that a wife, though under the common law disability to sue
her husband generally, could by a bill in equity seek the pro-
tection, recovery, and security of her separate property.
No assistance can be gained from these cases in deciding
whether a wife's disability is substantive or procedural.
If the wife's disability to sue her husband is not a sub-
stantive one, it would appear that after the divorce she
should be allowed to sue on causes of action arising during
coverture, inasmuch as the other factor before noted, i.e.,
domestic harmony, has been ipso facto removed by an a
vinculo divorce. A case which may lend some support to
this argument was Barton v. Barton,2' decided by the Court
of Appeals some years prior to the emancipatory acts. In
that case a wife sued her deceased husband's executors in
Sezzin v. Stark, 187 Md. 241, 255,49 A. 2d 242 (1946).
24 Thompson v. Thompson, supra, n. 10, 617.
Supra, ns. 9, 11.
226 Am. Jur., Husband & Wife, Sec. 128, p. 753. Maryland held them void:
Lyell v. Walbach, 113 Md. 574, 77 A. 1111 (1910) ; Burton v. Marshall, 4 Gill.
487 (1846).
Wilson v. Wilson, 86 Md. 638, 39 A. 276 (1898) ; Cochrane v. Cochrane,
139 Md. 530, 115 A. 811 (1921).
"32 Md. 214 (1870).
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contract at law for recovery of amounts loaned before
marriage and for an amount for securities loaned during
the marriage on the husband's express promise to repay.
The court pointed out that public policy forbade a wife
suing her husband at law before the statutory changes, and
only allowed suit in equity for recovery and protection of
her separate property. It held, however, that since under
the Maryland statute" the wife could now hold legal title
to her separate property, and the husband's executors were
strangers to her, there was no compelling reason for pre-
venting the wife from suing the executors for debts owed
by the husband at his death and growing out of contracts
concerning her separate estate. In the course of the opinion,
the court said:
"But it was also contended that a debt due by the
husband to the wife for money lent before marriage,
became extinguished by the marriage. At common law,
such would have been the result. But the Code has
changed the law in this respect, and by enacting that a
woman shall hold to her sole and separate use all the
property belonging to her at the time of the marriage,
has the effect of preventing such a debt from being
extinguished by the marriage."30
In a subsequent case 31 the administrators of a deceased wife
charged the share of decedent's surviving husband with
certain sums among which were sums for medical expenses
and merchandise sold to the wife and paid by the adminis-
trators. The court upheld these charges against the hus-
band's share of the wife's estate. It should be noted in
regard to these two cases that the considerations of public
policy against a wife suing her husband had been entirely
obviated by death of one of the parties. No domestic dis-
cord would result from allowing recovery.
It is submitted that there may be compelling reasons
for a determination by the Court that the disability of a
wife is substantive and cannot be revived by severing the
marriage. As has been noted, the wife's disability in regard
to suing the husband emanates from the broad public policy
to uphold marriages and hence to lessen the occasion for
discord which would be caused by suit between the parties.
Should it be the rule that the wife is merely disabled pro-
cedurally, and hence has a right without a remedy which
2 Md. Code (1951), Art. 45, Secs. 3 and 4.
S* upra, n. 28, 224.
31 Anderson v. Carter, 175 Md. 540, 2 A. 2d 077 (1938).
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may be transformed into a right with a remedy merely by
severing absolutely the matrimonial tie, a wife disabled
from recovering a substantial sum from her husband while
under coverture would have a greater than usual incentive
for removing that bar by divorce- a vinculo. Obviously this
motivation would run counter to the legal philosophy of
preserving marriage.
The question is not wholly academic. It may well have
its impact in the field of Conflict of Laws. For example,
New York has by a statutes2 in 1937 granted a wife the right
to sue her husband in tort. Maryland, as we have seen, has
not accorded the wife this privilege. Should a tort cause
of action between a Maryland domiciled husband and wife
arise in New York, and be sued on in Maryland, the true
nature of the wife's disability in Maryland could play a
significant role in the decision. In the instant case the ques-
tion of the type of disability could become important if
Mrs. Gregg should later obtain an a vinculo divorce.
Regardless of whether the Court should have reached a
different result, it is submitted that they could have done
so without doing violence to the statute."' In an earlier
Maryland case 4 the Court of Appeals clarified the law as
to future payments to a wife or child. The Gregg case com-
plements this by a clarification of a wife's right to recover
from her husband for past expenses. From the decision we
may learn that the common law disability of a wife is still
a vital force to reckon with under the emancipatory acts.
Judge Marbury, in closing for the Court, indicated the one
avenue of approach to the problem. ". . . we cannot extend
the plain words of the fifty-year-old statute to cover a case
which was either not envisioned or not intended to be in-
cluded at the time it was enacted. If now this omission
should be repaired, it is for the Legislature, and not for us,
to act. '
'8 5
N. Y. Domestic Relations Law, See. 57 (C. L. S., 1950).
Supra, circa, n. 21.
"Yost v. Yost, 172 Md. 128, 190 A. 753 (1937), noted, 2 Md. L. Rev.
60 (1937).
87 A. 2d 581, 584 (1952).
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